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Graham v. Connor: A Reasonable
Approach to Excessive Force Claims
Against Police Officers
Federal courts, when faced with a plaintiff's claim that the police
used excessive force in making an arrest,1 have until recently, applied
a fourteenth amendment substantive due process test 2  a fourth
amendment reasonableness standard, 3 or a combination of the two, 4
1. See infra notes 2-4. These excessive force claims against police officers arise in the
context of Civil Rights actions under Title 42 United States Code section 1983. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). This statute provides a statutory civil remedy for the deprivation,
under color of state authority, of any rights secured by the Constitution. See also infra notes
36-43 and accompanying text (plaintiffs often join as defendants the police department and
municipal government).
2. See, e.g., Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1987) (no substantive due
process violation in subduing arrestee by hitting him over the head with catsup bottle; arrestee
had made numerous threats to use deadly force against authorities and was armed), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.
1986) (allegation of unprovoked police assault, including kicking suspect while in custody,
stated a claim); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1006 (lth Cir. 1986) (evidence that arrestee
suffered injury which required surgery held sufficient to withstand defendants' motion for
summary judgment); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1985) (use of force
in effecting arrest not actionable where claimant suffered no physical injury), rev'd, Lester v.
City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1987) (fourth amendment standard, not
substantive due process standard, governs excessive force in arrest claims). See also Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that application of undue force by police
officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law), cert. denied sub nom.
Employee-Officer John, #1765 Badge Number v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (apprehension of a suspect by
use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirements of the fourth
amendment); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987) (fourth amendment
standard governs excessive force in arrest claims); Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (4th
Cir. 1985) (fourth amendment provides arrestee with a specific source of constitutional
protection against excessive force), rev'd, Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987)
(applying substantive due process test to uphold defense verdict in arrestee's section 1983
action), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461 (1989) (vacated for reconsideration in light of Graham v.
Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989)).
4. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming
dismissal of fourth amendment claim on ground that there was no seizure; reversing dismissal
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to assess the constitutionality of the police officer's conduct.- In
Graham v. Connor,6 the United States Supreme Court signaled the
death knell for the substantive due process test as applied to claims
that the police used excessive force in effecting an arrest or stop.
The Court held that the fourth amendment reasonableness standard
is the exclusive standard by which courts should evaluate these
excessive force claims?
Part I of this Note reviews the protection against excessive force
provided by the United States Constitution and 42 United States
Code section 1983, and examines the substantive due process test
and the fourth amendment reasonableness test.' Part II summarizes
the facts of Graham and the Supreme Court's opinion.9 Part III
discusses the possible legal ramifications of the Graham decision.' 0
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Protection Against Excessive Force
of fourteenth amendment substantive due process claim arising out of suspect's death at police
roadblock), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1382-83 (1989) (finding a seizure, the Court held the
allegation that police set up roadblock in a manner likely to kill Brower stated a section 1983
claim under the fourth amendment); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1416-17 (9th
Cir. 1987) (allegation that while one police officer held the plaintiff in a chokehold, a second
officer began to knee plaintiff in the groin and strike him in the face and then fatally shot
plaintiff in the back during detention in a parking lot, was sufficient to state a claim for
deprivation of both fourth and fourteenth amendment rights), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935
(1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501-02 (1lth Cir. 1985) (using both fourth
amendment and substantive due process analyses to hold police officers liable under section
1983 for beating and then shooting to death a suspect while effecting arrest), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1115 (1986), cert. denied sub nom., Sampson v. Gilmere, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986).
5. Excessive force claims brought under section 1983 arise in several different contexts.
The courts apply different constitutional standards in evaluating these claims based on the
plaintiff's status at the time of the encounter. Plaintiffs fall into one of three categories: (1)
persons subjected to arrests or investigatory stops; (2) pretrial detainees; and (3) convicted
prisoners. Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (arrestee) with Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (pretrial detainee), cert. denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John,
#1765 Badge Number v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312
(1986) (convicted prisoner). This Note focuses on the first category, with some discussion of
the second category. See infra notes 56-190 and accompanying text. A detailed discussion of
section 1983 actions brought by convicted prisoners is beyond the scope of this Note.
6. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
7. Id. at 1871. See infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 11-119 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 120-55 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 156-89 and accompanying text.
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1. The Fourteenth Amendment
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution admonishes: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ."I' The application of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause to protect citizens against excessive force by
police officers has its roots in the landmark case of Rochin v.
California.2 In that case, Rochin argued that the Court should
overturn his conviction because evidence used to convict him was
allegedly obtained by brutal force, in violation of constitutional
guarantees of due process of law."
The Court reviewed the due process clause, defining it as a sum-
marized constitutional guarantee of respect for personal immunities
which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 4 or are so rooted
in the conscience of the American people as to be considered fun-
damental. 5 When reviewing a conviction, the Court stated, the due
process clause mandates an examination of the entire course of
criminal proceedings, from arrest to conviction, to determine whether
those proceedings offend standards of decency and fairness which
promote underlying notions of justice. 16 Applying these generalized
concepts, the Court found that Rochin indeed was denied his right
to due process of law. 17 Accordingly, the Court reversed his convic-
tion. 8
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). For more on the factual context and legal issues presented in
Rochin, see infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
13. 342 U.S. at 172, 174. More typically however, excessive force claims arise in the
context of civil actions against the police officers involved. See supra notes 2-4.
14. 342 U.S. at 169. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (although
defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life in prison, and on
appeal by the state was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, a state statute
permitting appeals by the state did not deprive defendant of life without due process of law),
rev'd, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (fifth amendment prohibition against
double jeopardy applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
15. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (view
of murder scene by jury, in presence of judge and counsel for prosecution and defense but
without accused's presence, did not violate accused's fourteenth amendment rights).
16. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (concluding that defendant was denied due process of law when
police stripped him naked and kept his clothes for three hours, detained him for three days
in a hotel room, questioned him continuously over that time, and wrongfully delayed his
arraignment).
17. 342 U.S. at 172-74.
18. Id. at 174.
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2. The Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides that "[tihe
right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . "19 While
there are no definitions for the terms "seizure" or "unreasonable"
within the explicit language of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has attempted to give meaning to these terms in several of its
decisions. In Terry v. Ohio,20 the Supreme Court held that a seizure
occurs when an officer restrains the liberty of a citizen by means of
physical force or a show of authority. 21 While an arrest is clearly a
seizure under the Terry standard,2 courts have struggled over whether
other encounters with the police, including so-called investigatory
detentions or "stops", rise to the level of seizures under the Terry
standard.23 To resolve this apparent ambiguity, the Supreme Court
in Florida v. Royer4 clarified the proper test for determining whether
a seizure had occurred.25 The Court held that a seizure occurs for
fourth amendment purposes if, in view of all the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave.
26
Of course, the fourth amendment does not prohibit all seizures.
Rather, only those seizures which are deemed unreasonable are
prohibited. 27 Generally, a seizure of a person by the police acting
19. U.S. CONST., amend. IV. See also infra note 89 (fourth amendment prohibition on
unreasonable seizures applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
20. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21. Id. at 19, n.16. See also 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SaszuR-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AimiNDmErr § 2.1(a) at 301 (1986) (seizure of a person "includes not only full-fledged arrests,
but also 'investigatory detentions' and any other 'detention of the [person] against his will."'
22. See supra note 21. See also Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (apprehension
of a suspect by the use of deadly force is clearly a seizure).
23. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
plurality opinion) (concluding that no seizure occurred when DEA agents approached suspect
on airport concourse, asked to see her driver's license and plane ticket, and asked her questions)
with id. at 560 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (assuming for purposes of the decision that
Mendenhall was seized; stating that under Justice Stewart's test the question would be extremely
close).
24. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
25. Id. at 502 (concluding that Royer was seized for fourth amendment purposes when
officers "identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer that he was suspected of
transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room, while retaining
his ticket and driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart. .
26. Id. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
27. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (holding that evidence obtained by
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pursuant to a warrant 28 based on probable cause, 29 and without
excessive force,30 is reasonable. 1
B. Title 42 United States Code Section 1983
Title 42 United States Code section 1983 provides a statutory
remedy, referred to as a section 1983 action, for state action resulting
in the deprivation of civil rights .32 In order to seek the remedial relief
state officers during a search, which if conducted by federal officers would have violated a
defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment,
is inadmissible in a federal criminal trial). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MiNlr. L. Rnv. 349, 388 (1974) (concluding that if police activity is not labeled
a "search" or "seizure," it is not subject to any significant restrictions and may in fact be
quite unreasonable).
28. Although the Supreme Court has expressed a "preference" for arrests pursuant to
warrants, it has never invalidated an arrest based on probable cause solely because police
officers failed to obtain a warrant. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 397 (citations omitted).
Additionally, almost all jurisdictions today follow the common law rule permitting a warrantless
felony arrest to be made when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has
been committed and that the person being arrested committed it. Id. Also, most state statutes
allow an officer to make a warrantless arrest for any misdemeanor committed in the officer's
presence. Id. at 395. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948) (state law determines
the validity of arrests without a warrant).
29. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). The Dunaway Court emphasized
that 7Terry created only a limited exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements-
that a "stop" based on reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime is reasonable. Id. at 207-09. Dunaway was taken from a neighbor's
house to the police station, and placed in an interrogation room. Id. at 203. Finding the
detention of Dunaway "in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest," and
not even "roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusioni]" in Terry, the Court found
statements Dunaway made during interrogation to be the fruit of an illegal seizure. Id. at 211-
14. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that a reasonable articulable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed, that the vehicle is unregistered, or that either an
occupant of the vehicle or the vehicle itself is subject to seizure for a violation of the law, is
sufficient to make a stop of the vehicle reasonable under the fourth amendment).
30. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (statute which authorized use
of deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed fleeing felony suspects held constitutionally
unreasonable).
31. See id. at 13, 15-16 (when assessing the reasonableness of police activity, the Court
also looks to the common law and to the laws of the states for guidance).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Id. Every year many section 1983 actions are filed against individual police officers, police
departments and municipalities, alleging the use of excessive force by the police during arrests,
stops, and pretrial detention. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989); Brower
v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989); Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1989);
Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989); Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.
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provided by section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of
rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 3 Originally called the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, section
1983 was enacted to provide a measure of federal control over state
officials who showed reluctance to enforce state laws protecting newly
freed slaves and union sympathizers.3 4 The statute created a federal
court cause of action, with the intended benefit of a neutral federal
forum, against state government officials who deprived citizens of
their civil rights.
3 5
The two primary aims of section 1983 are to compensate victims
of past abuses and to deter future constitutional deprivations by
government officials. 6 Unfortunately for potential plaintiffs, in 1961
the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape317 severely limited the likelihood
that section 1983 plaintiffs would be compensated. In Monroe, the
Court held that because local governments were not "persons" within
the meaning of section 1983, they were immune from suit.
38 Later
Supreme Court cases further eroded the ability of wronged plaintiffs
to recover by granting at least a qualified immunity by way of a
good faith defense to most government officials.
39
1989); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989); Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200 (9th
Cir. 1989); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989); Graham v. Davis, 880 F.2d 1414
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1989); Lynch v.
City of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1989); Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir.
1989); Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 (lth Cir. 1989); Miller v. Taylor,
877 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1989); Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766 (l1th Cir. 1989); Merritt v.
County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.
1989); Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1989); Bordanaro v. McLeod,
871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989); Grant v. Farnsworth, 869 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1989); Duncan
v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1989). These cases represent just a sampling of the section
1983 excessive force cases considered by the United States Supreme Court and the federal
courts of appeal in 1989. See W. S. DoRNETrE & R. CRoss, FEDERAL JUDICIARY ALMANAC
735-50 (3d ed. 1987) For the period July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986, 261 civil rights
actions were filed in federal district court in North Carolina, the state in which Graham v.
Connor arose. Of these, 39 were cases in which the United States was a party while the
remainder were between private parties (including municipalities and police departments). Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979) (first step in any
section 1983 case is to "isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant]
is charged").
34. 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnmv. NEws 2609.
35. Id.
36. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980).
37. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
38. Id. at 187-91.
39. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (qualified immunity for prison
officials and officers); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for
prosecutors in initiating and presenting a case for the state); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975) (qualified immunity for school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
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In 1978, the tide began to turn in favor of section 1983 plaintiffs.
In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,4° the
United States Supreme Court overruled Monroe insofar as Monroe
held that local governments were not "persons" within the meaning
of section 1983. 41 The Court did an extensive, "fresh" analysis of
the congressional debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, concluding
that Congress intended section 1983 to apply to municipalities and
other local government entities. 42 The Court held that a municipality
may be sued directly where the allegedly unconstitutional conduct
implements or executes a policy statement, regulation, ordinance, or
other decision officially adopted and promulgated by that munici-
pality's officers. 43
(1974) (qualified immunity for state governor, president of a state university, and officers and
members of a state National Guard); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity
for judges; good faith and probable cause defense for police officers). At least one section
1983 immunity was recognized prior to Monroe. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376
(1951) (absolute immunity for legislators acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity). Cf. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (13 Wall. 646, 649) (1871) (common law
absolute immunity from suit for judges acting within their judicial jurisdiction). There is a
key procedural difference between the absolute and qualified immunities. As long as the
official's actions are within the defined scope of the immunity, an absolute immunity defeats
a lawsuit at its inception. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). On the other
hand, the outcome of an action against an official with a qualified immunity depends on all
the circumstances, including the motive of the official, as established by the evidence at trial.
Id. For example, in Imbler, the Supreme Court held that in initiating and presenting the
State's case, a prosecutor is immune from a civil damage action under section 1983. Id. at
431. The Court rejected the argument by Justice White that only a qualified immunity should
be accorded when the prosecutor unconstitutionally withholds information relevant to the
defense. Id. at 431 n.34. Thus, the protection against liability for damages provided by an
absolute immunity is very broad indeed. Of course, the prosecutor may be subject to criminal
prosecution for misconduct. Id. at 429. On the other hand, in Wood v. Strickland, the Court
held that in imposing disciplinary penalties, public school board members have only a qualified
immunity from liability for damages under section 1983. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
322 (1975). The Court held that a school board member loses that immunity if the member
knew, or reasonably should have known, that the action he or she took would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if the member took the action with the
"malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student." Id. The Court further held that a damage award against the school board member
would only be appropriate where the member acted with "such an impermissible motivation
or with such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action
cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." Id. Applying the second part of
the Wood standard, the Court in Procunier v. Navarette held that while a malicious intent to
harm will defeat a prison official's qualified immunity, that immunity should not be defeated
by an allegation of negligent and inadvertent interference with a prisoner's mailing privileges.
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 566 (1978). Thus, the Court concluded that the district
court correctly entered summary judgment for the defendants on this claim for relief. Id.
40. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
41. Id. at 663, 690.
42. Id. at 665-89, 691.
43. Id. at 690-91. However, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable in a section
1983 action solely on the basis of a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 691.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22
The next pro-plaintiff development came in Owen v. City of
Independence." In Owen, the Supreme Court held that a municipality
cannot assert a good faith defense in a section 1983 action.45 The
Court reviewed the various immunities conferred on government
officials under section 1983, finding that in each case the immunity
was firmly rooted in the common law and supported by strong policy
reasons. 46 In contrast, the Court found no tradition of, nor any
policy supporting, a qualified immunity for municipalities.
4 7 In fact,
the Court found that such an immunity would serve to defeat the
purposes of section 1983: compensating victims who suffer depriva-
tions of their constitutional rights and deterring future deprivations
of such rights.48 Therefore, the Court held that a municipality is
foreclosed from asserting the good faith of its officers as a defense
in a section 1983 action.49 An additional advantage for section 1983
plaintiffs came with the passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Act of 1976.50 Under this statute, a court may, in its discretion,
allow the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
5'
Although there has been a significant move in clearing the path
for plaintiff recoveries in section 1983 actions, some obstacles remain.
For example, plaintiffs must anticipate and contend with a good
faith defense asserted by individual police officers.5 2 Under this
defense, a police officer is not liable under section 1983 for using
constitutionally excessive force if the officer acts in reliance on a
statute which the officer reasonably believes in good faith to be
valid, but which is later held unconstitutional.53 Also, while damages
for tangible losses such as doctor and hospital bills, other actual
medical expenses, and loss of income may be easy to prove, intangible
elements of damage such as pain and suffering present more difficult
44. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
45. Id. at 638.
46. Id. at 637-38.
47. Id. at 638.
48. Id. at 651-52.
49. Id. at 638.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (police officer not liable under
section 1983 for false arrest if arrest made with probable cause and under a statute which the
officer reasonably believed in good faith to be valid but which is later held unconstitutional).
53. See, e.g., id.; Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 600 F.2d 52, 54 (6th Cir. 1979)
(affirming district court's ruling that police officer who fired fatal shot acted in good faith
reliance on state statute, which allowed an officer to kill a fleeing felon rather than run the
risk of allowing the felon to escape, and was therefore immune), aff'd sub nom. Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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problems of proof and valuation. In any case, where an individual
officer is found solely liable for damages, actual recovery depends
on the existence of non-exempt assets of the officer from which the
judgment can be satisfied.54 Finally, when the claimant is a convicted
criminal, or even a suspected criminal, a jury is likely to be unsym-
pathetic to his or her claim.5
C. Case Law
1. The Rise of the Substantive Due Process Test
In Rochin v. California,56 the United States Supreme Court reversed
Rochin's conviction for possession of pills containing morphine.
5 7
Police officers, acting on a tip that Rochin was selling drugs, entered
his home through an open door, forced their way into Rochin's
room, and jumped on him when they observed him swallowing some
54. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 704.710-.850 (West 1987) (homestead exemption
and related procedures); id. §§ 704.010-.210 (personal property exemptions). An exemption is
defined as "the freedom of property of debtors from liability to seizure and sale under legal
process for the payment of their debts." 35 C.J.S. Exemptions § 1 (1960). A homestead
consists of a dwelling house constituting the family residence, together with the land on which
the house sits. 40 C.J.S Homesteads § 1 (1944). As used in various homestead exemption
statutes, the term "homestead" refers not only to the property, but also to the right to have
the property exempted from levy and forced sale. Id. Personal property exemptions may cover
realty as well as personalty, and are based solely on constitutional or statutory provisions. 35
C.J.S. Exemptions § 1 (1960). See, e.g., CAL. CV. PROC. CODE § 704.040 (West 1987) (jewelry,
heirlooms, and works of art are exempt to the extent that the aggregate equity therein does
not exceed $2500); id. § 704.200 (exemption for certain cemetery plots). See also Note, The
"'Reasonable" Approach to Excessive Force Cases Under Section 1983, 64 NOTmE DAME L.
Rv. 136, 152 (1989) (noting that "the average patrol officer earns some $21,700 per year and
hardly provides a 'deep pocket' to satisfy a judgment.") (citation omitted).
55. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-23 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger asserted that "j]urors may well refuse to penalize a
police officer at the behest of a person they believe to be a criminal and probably will not
punish an officer for honest errors of judgment." Id. He concluded that Congress should
create a statutory damage remedy against the government itself for persons whose fourth
amendment rights have been violated by federal officers, and a quasi-judicial tribunal to
adjudicate claims under the statute. Id. See also Amsterdam, supra note 27, at 430. Professor
Amsterdam took the position that police searches and seizures should only be scrutinized in
evidence suppression hearings. The professor implied that lawyers would be unwilling to handle
ordinary search and seizure cases for plaintiffs in the type of tribunal suggested by Chief
Justice Burger in Bivens, in part because "[p]olice cases are an unadulterated investigative and
litigative nightmare. Taking on the police in any tribunal involves a commitment to the most
frustrating and thankless legal work I know." Id.
56. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
57. Id. at 174.
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pills.58 Unable to retrieve the pills, the police took Rochin to a
hospital, where, at an officer's direction, a doctor forced a solution
into Rochin's stomach against his will to induce vomiting. 9 The
resultant vomiting produced two pills containing morphine, which
were used as evidence in convicting RochinA0 The Court held that
the conviction was obtained by methods offensive to the due process
clause.6'
The Court in Rochin acknowledged that the concept of due process
is not fixed, but requires continuous application of judgment by the
courts on a case by case basis.6 2 The Court held that the due process
clause prohibits convictions obtained by methods which offend a
sense of justice.63 Applying the general principles of due process to
the above facts, the Court concluded that "the proceedings by which
this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience." (emphasis
added).64
Although an arrest case, Rochin provided the foundation for the
extension of substantive due process protection against excessive force
to pretrial detainees. In Johnson v. Glick,65 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, in reversing the dismissal of Johnson's section 1983
action, held that Johnson stated a claim against the prison guard
who allegedly attacked him without provocation." Johnson, a pre-
trial detainee, alleged that an officer of the Manhattan House of
Detention grabbed him by the collar, struck him twice, threatened
to kill him, and refused to provide Johnson with prompt medical
attention when requested.6 7
The Johnson court first considered and rejected the applicability
of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
58. Id. at 166.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 174.
62. Id. at 170.
63. Id. at 173. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (use of confession
obtained by coercion and brutality, which served as basis for murder conviction, constitutes
denial of due process).
64. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
65. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John, #1765
Badge Number v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
66. Id. at 1033-34.
67. Id. at 1029-30.
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punishment to Johnson's claim. 68 Though it found the eighth amend-
ment inapplicable, the court asserted that it would be absurd to hold
that pre-trial detainees have less protection than convicted prisoners
against the acts of prison guards.6 9 Therefore, the court held that
both before and after sentencing, constitutional protectiQn against
police brutality is not limited to conduct violating the eighth or
fourth amendments. 70 Rather, the court concluded that Rochin sup-
ported the proposition that apart from any specific provision of the
Bill of Rights, "application of undue force by law enforcement
officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law."
7'
The Johnson court further defined the "shocks the conscience"
standard of Rochin by articulating a four factor substantive due
process test for analyzing excessive force claims.7 2 The court held
that in determining whether a detainee's constitutional rights have
been violated, a court must look to such factors as:
[1] [The need for the application of force, [2] the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] the
extent of injury inflicted, and [4] whether force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
73
The federal courts of appeal almost unanimously adopted the John-
son substantive due process test or a variation thereof.74 Further,
68. Id. at 1031-32. The eighth amendment provides, in part: "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, . . . nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
The Johnson court had no difficulty in finding that the eighth amendment places limits on
certain types of prison discipline, such as corporal punishment and solitary confinement.
Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032. Additionally, the court recognized that the eighth amendment
protects prisoners against intolerable conditions of confinement. Id. However, the court
concluded that although an unprovoked attack by a guard such as the one allegedly suffered
by Johnson would be cruel and unusual, it would not fit any ordinary definition of punishment.
Id. Because the eighth amendment only provides protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, the court held it to be inapplicable under the facts presented. Id. The court concluded
that this was especially clear in this case since Johnson had not been convicted, and thus was
not even subject to punishment. Finally, the court expressed doubt that the cruel and unusual
punishment provision ever applies before conviction. Id.
69. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032.
70. Id.
71. Id. But see Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1259 (1985) (arguing that later Supreme
Court decisions identified the due process clause of the fifth amendment as a specific source
of constitutional protection against unjustified invasions of bodily security) (citing Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977)).
72. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. While recognizing that the "shocks the conscience" test
of Rochin was not capable of systematic application, the Johnson court found that it "at
least points the way." Id.
73. Id. This test will be referred to throughout this Note as the "substantive due process
test."
74. See supra note 2 (cases adopting the Johnson test); see also infra note 114 and
accompanying text (cases adopting a three-part variation of the Johnson test).
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although the Johnson case involved a pretrial detainee, a majority
of the courts not only applied the Johnson substantive due process
test to excessive force claims of pretrial detainees, 75 but extended its
application to excessive force claims arising out of arrests76 and
stops.
77
Of the four Johnson factors, the last factor created the greatest
obstacle to recovery for plaintiffs. 7  This "malicious and sadistic"
factor required an inquiry into the officer's subjective state of mind
to determine whether the officer was motivated by a desire to
maintain order or by a malicious desire to cause harm.79 Under this
prong of the test, an officer acting in a good faith effort to maintain
order could use objectively unreasonable force on a suspect without
violating that suspect's due process rights. 0 This subjective inquiry
75. Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir. 1989) (between arrest and conviction,
excessive force claims are properly evaluated under the substantive due process test), cert.
denied sub nom. Wilkins v. McDaniel, 110 S. Ct. 733 (1990); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380,
383 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461 (1989); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792
F.2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986) (negligent conduct by state official not enough to state a claim
under section 1983); Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 418-19 (8th Cir. 1981) (to state a claim,
pre-trial detainees are not required to prove cruel and unusual punishment because they do
not stand convicted of any crime). Some courts have also applied the substantive due process
test to excessive force claims of convicted prisoners. See, e.g., Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d
1253, 1258-59 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming plaintiff's $10,000 judgment against three prison
officials who administered beating on the plaintiff); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963, 970 (4th
Cir. 1984) (use of mace on unruly inmate is not per se unconstitutional); Meredith v. Arizona,
523 F.2d 481, 482-84 (9th Cir. 1975) (assault by prison guard violates right to liberty). However,
most courts apply an eighth amendment analysis in evaluating a prisoner's claim. See, e.g.,
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (eighth amendment violation requires proof of
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain).
76. Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014
(1988); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446-48 (9th Cir. 1986); Gumz v.
Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), rev'd,
Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d
1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (concurrently analyzed under fourth amendment). See also Comment,
Excessive Force Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1369, 1376
(1986) (citing cases).
77. Brower v. County of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1987) (concurrently analyzed
under fourth amendment), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d
1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), (concurrently analyzed under fourth amendment), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 935 (1987).
78. See, e.g., Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248-49 (W.D.N.C. 1986)
(granting a defense motion for directed verdict, the court found that the force used against
the plaintiff was applied in a "good faith effort to maintain or restore order in the face of a
potentially explosive situation"), aff'd 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. Graham
v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
79. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Employee-
Officer John, #1765 Badge Number v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). See Freyermuth,
Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 Duic L.J. 692, 693 (1987) (substantive due process test
requires the factfinder to consider the officer's subjective motivation).
80. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1374. Cf. Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772
(3d Cir. 1979) (prisoner failed to state a section 1983 claim because he failed to allege an
improper state of mind on the part of prison guards).
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into the officer's state of mind received a good deal of criticism by
commentators8 and section 1983 plaintiffs, 82 and resulted in some
courts rejecting the substantive due process test altogether.83 Despite
these criticisms, the Johnson substantive due process test gained a
strong foothold in the federal courts of appeal.
84
2. The Movement Toward the Fourth Amendment Standard
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner,8
addressed a section 1983 claim of excessive force in an arrest context.
In Garner, a father, whose unarmed son was shot to death by a
police officer as the son fled from a burglary of an unoccupied
house, brought a wrongful death action under section 1983.86 The
officer was authorized to use deadly force by a Tennessee statute
and by Memphis Police Department policy.
87
81. Freyermuth, supra note 79 at 693, 701 (officer's subjective motivation is often irrelevant
under the tests developed by the Supreme Court to protect eighth and fourth amendment
rights implicated by the use of excessive force). See also Comment, supra note 76, at 1382
(arguing that "the substantive due process standard gives greater protection to [unlawful]
police conduct than does the fourth amendment approach") (emphasis in original).
82. See, e.g., Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461
(1989). In Justice, the plaintiff argued that the Johnson test created an impermissibly high
threshold for liability under section 1983. Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals noted
that while section 1983 liability may be imposed if an officer exceeds the limits of privileged
force, "the threshold for that liability must be higher than that set for a normal tort action."
Id. at 381-82.
83. See Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[tlhis subjective
inquiry into motive is incompatible with a Fourth Amendment standard that calls for objective
analysis without regard to the officer's underlying intent or motivation").
84. See supra notes 2, 4 and 75-77 (cases applying the Johnson substantive due process
test or a variation thereof).
85. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
86. Id. at 3-5. The defendants included the officer who fired the shot, the police
department, its director, the mayor, and the city of Memphis. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 4. The statute provided that if a police officer gave notice of his intention to
arrest a suspect and the suspect then attempted to flee or forcibly resist, the officer could use
all means to effect the arrest. Id. The department policy, while somewhat more restrictive
than the statute, still allowed the use of deadly force in cases of burglary. Id. at 5. See Note,
Tennessee v. Garner: Invoking the Fourth Amendment to Limit Police Use of Deadly Force,
6 PACE L. REV. 671, 703 n.224 (1986):
The Memphis Police Department Shooting Policy reads: Deadly Force: DEADLY
FORCE may be used in the following circumstances only after all other reasonable
means to apprehend or otherwise prevent the offense have been exhausted: (a) Self-
Defense. An officer may use DEADLY FORCE when it is in the defense of himself
or another from serious bodily injury or death and the threat of serious bodily
injury or death is real and immediate. (b) Felonies Involving the Use or Threatened
Use of Physical Force. An officer may use DEADLY FORCE when the offense
involves a felony and the suspect uses or attempts to use or threatens the use of
physical force against any person. (c) Other Felonies Where DEADLY FORCE is
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Without overruling the substantive due process test or explaining
its reasons for ignoring that method of analysis, the Court analyzed
the propriety of the police officer's conduct under the fourth amend-
ment.88 First, the Court concluded that apprehension of a suspect by
the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness
requirements of the fourth amendment. 9 Additionally, the Court
held that the reasonableness of a seizure depends not only on when
it is made, but how it is made.90 The Court asserted that when
evaluating the constitutionality of a seizure, the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests must
be balanced against the importance of the governmental interests
allegedly justifying the intrusion. 91 This objective standard focuses
upon whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the particular
seizure was justified. 92 The Court struck down the Tennessee statute
because it allowed the use of deadly force against all felony suspects,
regardless of the circumstances, and therefore was constitutionally
unreasonable. 93
Authorized. After all reasonable means of preventing or apprehending a suspect
have been exhausted, DEADLY FORCE is authorized in the following crimes: (a)
kidnapping, (b) murder in the first or second degree, (c) manslaughter, (d) arson
(including the use of fire bombs), (e) rape, (f) assault and battery with intent to
carnally know a child under 12 years of age, (g) assault and battery with intent to
commit rape, (h) burglary in the first, second, or third degree, (i) assault to commit
murder in the first or second degree, (0) assault to commit voluntary manslaughter,
(k) armed and simple robbery...
Id. (quoting Reply Brief Of Petitioners at 3-5, Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240
(6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
88. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-22. Apparently, the plaintiff in Garner made a strategic decision
to drop his contention that the substantive due process test provided an alternative basis for
recovery in the action. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1874 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part) ("[n]owhere in Garner is a substantive due process standard for evaluating
the use of excessive force in a particular case discussed; there is no suggestion that such a
standard was offered as an alternative and rejected").
89. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Applying the selective incorporation
doctrine, the Court in Mapp held that the fourth amendment's right of privacy is enforceable
against the states by "the same sanction of exclusion [of seized evidence] as is used against
the Federal Government." Id. at 655. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (the
standard of reasonableness is the same for the states under the fourteenth amendment as it is
for the federal government under the fourth amendment).
90. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8. The Court held that the police may use deadly force to prevent
escape if they have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm to the officer or to others. Id. at 11.
91. Id. at 8. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (holding government
interests insufficient to justify a lengthy detention of petitioner's luggage without probable
cause).
92. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.
93. Id. at 11. The Court did not reach the issue of the validity of the police department
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As a result of the Garner decision, several commentators called
for the elimination of the use of the substantive due process test in
the context of arrests and stops. 94 While some complained that the
continued use of both tests was redundant, 95 others argued that the
substantive due process test required consideration of irrelevant is-
sues, such as the extent of the plaintiff's injury.
96 Furthermore, some
courts interpreted Garner as implicitly mandating the application of
the fourth amendment standard to all excessive force claims arising
from arrests and stops. 97 Use of the fourth amendment standard is
required, these courts asserted, because the fourth amendment, and
not the fourteenth, specifically prohibits unreasonable seizures.
98
In Lester v. City of Chicago,99 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly rejected the use of the substantive due process test in
evaluating claims of excessive force in arrest situations.1
°° The court
recognized that the issue in Garner was the constitutionality of using
deadly force in making an arrest.' 0' However, the court reasoned
that implicit in the Supreme Court's "totality of the circumstances"
approach was the conclusion that the use of non-deadly force by
police, unless justified under the circumstances, would also violate
the fourth amendment.10 2 Thus, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
policy, citing the absence of any discussion of the issue by the courts below and the "uncertain
state of the record." Id. at 22. The Court remanded the case for determination of the potential
liability of the city of Memphis and the police department under Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id.
94. See supra note 81.
95. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 76, at 1370, 1385-86 (concluding that since the fourth
amendment standard is more restrictive than the Johnson substantive due process test, elimi-
nation of the latter in evaluating excessive force in arrest claims is proper if not required).
96. Freyermuth, supra note 79, at 693 (calling on the United States Supreme Court to
reject the applicability of the substantive due process test to claims of excessive force during
arrest).
97. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1987) (Garner's fourth
amendment standard applies to all excessive force in arrest claims, not just those involving
deadly force); Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd, Justice v. Dennis, 834
F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461 (1989).
98. Lester, 830 F.2d at 712. See also Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.
1984). The court in Bell upheld a special verdict finding no excessive force in the stop, chase
and attempted apprehension of Bell, noting that analysis of this issue under the fourth rather
than the fourteenth amendment was "most appropriate because 'the Fourth Amendment is
specifically directed to methods of arrest and seizure of the person."' Id. at 1278 & n.87
(quoting Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1983)).
99. 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 710. Mrs. Lester alleged that two Chicago police officers arrested her without
probable cause for disorderly conduct and used excessive force in making the arrest. Id. at
707. At trial, a jury found for the officers on both claims, and judgment was entered for the
defendants. Id.
101. Id. at 711.
102. Id. See Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (4th Cir. 1985). Kidd was subsequently
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held that the Garner fourth amendment reasonableness standard
applies to all claims that the police used excessive force in making
an arrest, not just those involving deadly force. 03 The court cited
Garner and other decisions to support its conclusion that historically
the Supreme Court has relied upon an objective fourth amendment
reasonableness analysis, instead of the substantive due process test,
in cases that involved very intrusive searches and seizures.' 0-
3. The Fourth Circuit Experience
A review of the decisions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
illustrates the conflicting views held by the courts on the proper
standard applicable to section 1983 excessive force claims after Gar-
ner. In Kidd v. O'Neil,105 the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court's
summary judgment for the defendant police officers. The court of
appeals held that the district court erred by failing to recognize that
the fourth amendment provides a direct source of protection against
the use of excessive force by the police in making arrests.'06 The
court declared that Garner firmly established that the fourth amend-
ment is the proper source of protection against the use of excessive
force by police in making arrests. 0 7 Additionally, the court of appeals
overruled by Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc), and Justice was later
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, in Justice v. Dennis, 109 S. Ct. 2461 (1989).
103. Lester, 830 F.2d at 711. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial
on the ground that giving an improper jury instruction, which stated the substantive due
process test for evaluating excessive force in arrest claims, was not harmless error. Id. at 714.
The trial judge had instructed the jury that in order to find that the officers had used excessive
force the jury had to find that; "[o]ne, there were severe injuries; two, that the force used
was grossly disproportionate to the need for force under the circumstances; and three, that
such gross disproportion was the consequence of something other than mere carelessness or
unwise zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that 'shocks the conscience.'
Id. at 709.
104. Id. at 711. In reaching its decision, the court cited the following decisions: Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985) (fourth amendment precluded the state from compelling
a robbery suspect to undergo surgery to remove a bullet which the state felt could provide
evidence as to the suspect's guilt or innocence); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 542-44 (1985) (fourth amendment applied to uphold a 16-hour detention of suspected
drug smuggler so police could examine her feces for drugs); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 766-72 (1966) (holding that admission of evidence obtained from a warrantless blood test
in a drunk driving case does not violate the fourth amendment).
105. 774 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 1254-55.
107. Id. at 1255-56. Additionally, the court concluded that Garner confirmed long-standing
circuit precedent holding that the fourth amendment provides the proper analysis. Id. (citing
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970) (applying fourth amendment standard)).
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished two of its prior decisions applying the
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held that the district court erred in importing a state of mind
requirement into section 1983 jurisprudence.108 The court remanded,
instructing the trial court to apply the fourth amendment reasona-
bleness standard to Kidd's claim. 1°9
Two years later, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Justice v.
Dennis,10 overruled its decision in Kidd. Justice, the plaintiff, claimed
that a highway patrolman tried to control him through the use of
excessive force after arresting him for drunk driving."' The jury
returned a verdict against Justice, and the U.S. Magistrate denied
his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, Justice argued that the jury was improperly instructed
on the standard for evaluating a section 1983 excessive force claim. n2
The jury instruction given at trial encompassed a variation of the
four-factor substantive due process test from Johnson v. Glick.13
Specifically, the instruction required an inquiry into:
[Whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so dispro-
portionate to the need presented and was so inspired by malice or
sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that
it amounted to a brutal or inhumane abuse of official power literally
shocking to the conscience." 4
substantive due process test, noting that neither case involved a claim of excessive force by
police in making an arrest. Id. at 1257. See Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980)
(public school student challenged use of corporal punishment by school officials); King v.
Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980) (convicted prisoner alleged prison officials used
excessive force in subduing him).
108. Kidd, 774 F.2d at 1255-56. The district court specifically rejected the substantive due
process test, and did not consider the fourth amendment reasonableness standard. Id. at 1253-
54. Instead, the district court concluded that the proper test was one applied in several Eastern
District of Virginia decisions. Id. at 1254 (citing Dandridge v. Police Dep't of Richmond, 566
F. Supp. 152 (E.D.Va. 1983) (excessive force in arrest claim)). Under the test, a battery by a
police officer could only infringe on a plaintiff's constitutional rights if the officer intended
to infringe that right or the infringement was reasonably foreseeable. Id. The court of appeals
in Kidd held that the district court erred in applying this test. Id. at 1255-56 (citing Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (refusing to construe section 1983 as requiring a plaintiff
to show that a state official acted with a specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of a federal
right)).
109. Id. at 1257. The court implicitly rejected the application of the substantive due process
test to excessive force in arrest claims. Id. at 1254-57. In fact, the court described the"malicious and sadistic" prong of that test as merely descriptive of the degree of force which
exceeds that amount an officer is privileged to use in a given situation. Id. at 1261 & n.15.
110. 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461 (1989).
111. Justice, 834 F.2d at 381. Specifically, plaintiff claimed the patrolman pushed him
against a wall with enough force to crack his front teeth, and maced him while he was
handcuffed. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 383 (citing Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963, 970 (4th Cir. 1984). See supra notes
72-84 and accompanying text (discussion of the Johnson v. Glick test).
114. Justice, 834 F.2d at 382. These instructions reflect a three-part test adopted by some
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Acknowledging that this instruction did not mirror the precise
language of the Johnson four-factor test,115 the court of appeals
nonetheless held that the instructions given adequately stated the
proper standard 1 6 for evaluating the plaintiff's section 1983 claim."
7
The court's holding expressly overruled Kidd to the extent Kidd
advocated application of the fourth amendment reasonableness stan-
dard, rather than the substantive due process test, in evaluating
excessive force claims arising out of an arrest.
118
4. Johnson to Garner and Beyond
For over a decade following the Johnson decision, the federal
courts of appeal applied the substantive due process test almost
religiously, if not exclusively, to section 1983 excessive force claims
of the circuit courts in analyzing excessive force claims which is very similar to the Johnson
test. See Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting the three-part
test), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), rev'd Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th
Cir. 1987); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (adopting the three-part
test); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (evaluating student's claim of corporal
punishment under the three-part test).
115. Justice, 834 F.2d at 383. The court preferred the instructions approved in Bailey v.
Turner, 736 F.2d 963, 970 (4th Cir. 1984). The jury must consider several factors, including,
one, the need for the application of the force; two, the relationship between the
need for the force and the amount of force used; three, the extent of injury inflicted;
and four, whether the force was applied in good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or was used maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.
Justice, 834 F.2d at 383. This is the Johnson test. See supra note 73 and accompanying text
(discussion of the Johnson v. Glick test).
116. Justice, 834 F.2d at 383 (citing Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd. O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072, 1076
(4th Cir. 1978)) (judgment must be affirmed if instruction as a whole adequately states the
pertinent legal principles involved).
117. Id. In his dissent, Judge Phillips criticized the en banc majority for assuming, without
discussion, that Justice was a pretrial detainee. Id. at 384. Judge Phillips acknowledged that
the instructions given reflected the substantive due process test. Id. at 386. However, he argued
that Justice's claim was one invoking fourth amendment rights, and therefore required only
that Justice prove that the force used against him exceeded that which was reasonably necessary
to keep him in custody. Id. at 384 (citing Kidd v. O'Neil 774 F.2d 1252, 1256 (4th Cir. 1985);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). It is unclear whether the majority was treating
Justice as an arrestee or a pretrial detainee. Compare id. at 383 (jury not precluded from
finding use of mace was a reasonable effort to regain control over a "violent and agitated
arrestee") with id. at 383 n.4 (implicitly referring to Justice as a pretrial detainee having fifth
amendment protection against excessive force) and id. at 382 (claims of excessive force may
arise in the context of fourth, or "as in this instance," the fifth amendment). While it seems
the majority treated Justice as a pretrial detainee, the court expressly overruled the Kidd
court's rejection, in what was clearly an arrest case, of the substantive due process test. See
Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1253 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus the majority apparently concluded
that the substantive due process test was the proper standard for evaluating excessive force
claims of both arrestees and pretrial detainees. Justice, 834 F.2d at 383.
118. Justice, 834 F.2d at 383. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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arising out of arrests and stops." 9 However, Garner, followed by
Kidd and Lester, rejected that test in favor of the fourth amendment
reasonableness standard. 20 Nevertheless, the court in Justice, two
years after Garner, demonstrated that confusion still plagued the
federal courts of appeal over which test was the "right" test. These
cases invited a decision by the Supreme Court to resolve the issue.




In Graham v. Connor,'2 1 petitioner Graham, a diabetic, was feeling
the onset of an insulin reaction and asked his friend William Berry
to drive him to a convenience store where he could buy juice to
counteract the reaction. 22 Upon entering the store, the plaintiff saw
several people ahead of him in line, hurriedly left, and asked Berry
to drive him to a friend's house. 23 Respondent Connor, a Charlotte,
North Carolina police officer who observed Graham's entrance and
quick exit from the store, followed the car and made an investigatory
stop. 24 Although Berry informed Connor that Graham was suffering
from a "sugar reaction," Connor ordered them to wait until he
found out what had occurred at the store. 25 Connor also radioed
for back-up police officers. 26
In the meantime, Graham sat down on the curb, where he passed
out briefly. 27 When the back-up officers arrived, several of them
lifted the unconscious Graham and placed him face down on the
hood of the car. 28 When Graham regained consciousness and lifted
119. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (cases applying the substantive due
process test to excessive force claims arising out of arrests and stops).
120. See supra notes 85-109 and accompanying text.
121. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).






128. Id. Before lifting Graham, the officers handcuffed him, one of them saying "Ain't
nothing wrong with the M.F. but drunk. Lock the S.B. up." Id.
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his head, one of the officers shoved Graham's face down against the
hood of the car. 29 Four officers then grabbed Graham and threw
him head first into the patrol car. 130 When Connor discovered that
Graham was not involved in any wrongdoing at the store, the officers
drove him home and released him.1
3 1
Graham, who suffered multiple injuries from the incident, includ-
ing a broken foot, filed suit in a United States District Court under
42 United States Code section 1983, alleging that the police used
excessive force in making the stop, in violation of his rights under
the fourteenth amendment. 32 At the close of Graham's evidence, the
district court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict.
33 Ap-
plying the four-factor test from Johnson v. Glick, the trial court
found that Graham suffered no discernible injury and that the force
was applied by the police in a good faith effort to maintain order.
3 4
Therefore, the district court held that Graham's claim did not give
rise to a section 1983 cause of action. 35 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that no reasonable jury applying the
substantive due process test could conclude that the force applied
was constitutionally excessive.
36
B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court held that the fourth amendment reasonableness standard is
the proper standard for analyzing all claims that police officers used
excessive force in making arrests, investigatory stops, or other seizures
of citizens. 137 In reaching its conclusion, the Court addressed several




132. Id. Graham also asserted pendent state law claims for false imprisonment, assault,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims were dismissed below and were
not before the Supreme Court. Id. at 1868 n.2.
133. Id. at 1868-69.
134. Id. at 1869. The district court found that the amount of force used "was 'appropriate
under the circumstances,' that '[t]here was no discernible injury inflicted,' and that the force
used 'was not applied maliciously or sadistically .. .' but in 'a good faith effort to maintain
or restore order . . . ."' Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248-49 (W.D.N.C.
1986).
135. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. at 1868-69.
136. Id. at 1869.
137. Id. at 1871. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. at 1867. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in part and in the judgment. Id. at 1873.
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Initially, the Court pointed out that most of the lower federal
courts were applying the substantive due process analysis to all
excessive force claims, without bothering to ask whether a more
specific constitutional right was implicated. 138 Justice Rehnquist re-
jected the notion that there is some generic right to be free from
excessive force, grounded in "basic principles of section 1983 juris-
prudence."' 39 In evaluating section 1983 excessive force claims, the
first step is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly
violated by the contested use of force.'" Courts must then evaluate
the claim under the specific constitutional standard applicable to that
right. ' 4  The Court concluded that in all cases of alleged excessive
force arising out of arrests and investigatory stops, the applicable
standard is the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard. 142
The Court found support for its conclusion in several sources.
First, the Court pointed out that in Garner, the claimant alleged
violations of both the due process clause and the fourth amend-
ment. 143 However, the Garner Court evaluated the constitutionality
of the disputed use of force exclusively under the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable seizures. 4 Second, the Court rea-
soned that the fourth amendment provides an express textual source
of protection against this type of physically intrusive governmental
conduct. 145 Therefore, the Court concluded that the fourth amend-
ment, not the more generalized concept of substantive due process,
provides the proper guide for evaluating excessive force claims against
law enforcement officers.'"
Holding that the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard gov-
erns all claims arising out of a police officer's alleged use of excessive
force duing seizures of the person, the Court then set out to define
the applicable "test."' 47 The Court held that under the fourth amend-
138. Id. at 1870.
139. Id. at 1870 & n.8 (quoting Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987),
vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461 (1989) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Graham).
140. Id. at 1870.
141. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-22 (1985) (analyzing claim of excessive
force in arrest under fourth amendment standard); and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)
(analyzing convicted prisoner's claim of excessive force under an eighth amendment analysis)).
142. Id. at 1871.
143. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985)).
144. Id. But see supra note 88.
145. Id.
146. Id. Note that the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures applies
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 89.
147. 109 S. Ct. at 1871-72.
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ment, the reasonableness of the force used in each case must be
evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene.'
48
The test is an objective one, asking whether the officers' actions
were objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances confronting
them, without considering their intent or motivation.
49 Under this
"totality of the circumstances" approach, the important facts and
circumstances to consider are: the severity of the crime the suspect
allegedly committed, whether the suspect posed a danger to the police
or others, and whether the suspect was resisting or fleeing.
50
Because the Johnson substantive due process test requires an
inquiry into the subjective motivations of the officers involved, the
Court held that it is incompatible with a proper fourth amendment
analysis.' 51 The Court rejected the suggestion of the court of appeals
that the "malicious and sadistic" prong of the Johnson test was
equivalent to inquiring whether the challenged conduct was objec-
tively reasonable under the circumstances. 5 2 The Court concluded
that the court of appeals' application of the Johnson test to Graham's
claim constituted reversible error.
53
C. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun, along with Justices Brennan and Marshall,
agreed that the fourth amendment provides the primary analytical
tool for analyzing excessive force claims in the pre-arrest context.
54
They also agreed with the majority's decision remanding the case for
reconsideration undr the reasonableness standard.
55 However, they
did not agree with the majority's decision to eliminate altogether the
use of the substantive due process test in pre-arrest claims of excessive
force. 5 6 Justice Blackmun found no basis for the majority's conten-
tion that Garner implicitly held that pre-arrest excessive force claims
must be analyzed under the fourth amendment rather than under the
substantive due process test. 57 Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that
148. Id. at 1872.




153. Id. at 1873.
154. Id. at 1873. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
155. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
156. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 1873-74. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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since Graham had dropped his contention that the substantive due
process test provided an alternative basis for recovery, the issue of
the viability of that test was not before the Court. 58
III. LEGAL RAMIFCATIONS
By foreclosing the use of the substantive due process test in arrest
and stop cases, the Court changed the prevailing law in most of the
lower federal courts. 5 9 Prior to the Graham decision, plaintiffs were
able to argue that excessive force used by the police violated their
constitutional rights under both the substantive due process test and
the fourth amendment standard. 60
A. Increased Likelihood That Plaintiffs Will Prevail
Although Graham will change the way many plaintiffs must plead
their section 1983 claims, application of the fourth amendment
standard will also increase the likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail,
at least in those jurisdictions which had previously applied only the
substantive due process test.' 61 While the fourth amendment standard
prohibits use of force that is objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances, the substantive due process test only prohibits police
conduct which is subjectively malicious or sadistic. 62 Thus, under
the substantive due process test, a jury could conclude that an officer
158. Id. at 1874. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. See supra notes 2, 4, 76-77, 114 and accompanying text (cases applying the substantive
due process test to excessive force claims brought under section 1983).
160. See supra note 4. This "double-barrelled" argument was questioned by some com-
mentators who perceived the courts as applying "redundant constitutional protections" to
arrestees pursuing claims of excessive force. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 76, at 1381.
161. See e.g., Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1988) (parents
of 16 year-old youth allege police used excessive force in fatally shooting their son); Stevens
v. Corbell, 832 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1987) (arrestee alleges excessive force by police during
booking process), cert. denied sub nom. Corbell v. Stevens, 486 U.S. 1033 (1988); Dale v.
Janklow, 828 F.2d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); Rutherford
v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986). See also supra notes 56-84 (discussing
the development of the substantive due process test), and supra note 2 (citing cases applying
the substantive due process test). See generally Note, supra note 54 at 141-42 (acknowledging
the split among the federal courts of appeal between the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard and the substantive due process test; citing cases).
162. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (explaining the fourth amendment
reasonableness standard); supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (explaining the substantive
due process test). See also Note, supra note 54, at 145 (the substantive due process test requires
evaluation of subjective factors such as malice).
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used unreasonable force under the circumstances, yet still exonerate
the officer because they do not find he or she acted maliciously or
sadistically.163 But under the fourth amendment standard, a conclu-
sion that the force used was unreasonable will lead to a plaintiff's
judgment, regardless of the officer's subjective intent.1
64
Furthermore, under the substantive due process test, even if the
plaintiff could prove that the police officer's conduct was inspired
by malice or sadism, the plaintiff still faced the challenge of showing
that the force applied caused severe injury. 65 While the extent of
injury is certainly relevant to the damages issue in a section 1983
action, the fourth amendment standard properly does not require a
minimum threshold of injury to establish liability.16 Therefore, under
the fourth amendment standard, more section 1983 excessive force
claims will withstand motions for summary judgment and directed
verdict. 167
Likewise, the "reasonableness" standard should also result in more
judgments for plaintiffs. Since more cases are likely to go to a jury,
claimants will at least have the opportunity to convince the jury they
have a valid claim. It will also be easier to convince the jury that a
police officer's application of force was objectively unreasonable,
163. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 1987) (jury might
find officers' conduct objectively unreasonable, but not shocking to the conscience, and thus
find against the plaintiff). For a useful analysis of Lester, see Note, supra note 54, at 140-47.
164. But see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of a
good faith defense for individual police officers).
165. See Note, supra note 54, at 145 (the substantive due process test mandates a finding
that the officer inflicted serious injury). See also Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp.
246, 248 (Wv.D.N.C. 1986) (acknowledging that plaintiff's foot was broken during the scuffle
with police, the district court nonetheless found that there was no evidence that the police
inflicted any injury on plaintiff), aff'd, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom.
Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
166. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1383. "[D]amages are recoverable in the fourth
amendment context even when no physical injury is alleged at all. Presumably, this would
apply to seizures as well as searches." (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
167. The district court in Graham, for example, granted a defense motion for directed
verdict which was affirmed by the court of appeals. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865,
1868-69 (1989). But see Note, supra note 54, at 154-55 (comparing the substantive due process
and fourth amendment tests). Discussing considerations of judicial efficiency, the authors
asserted that the substantive due process test, with its focus on the police officer's state of
mind, does not lend itself to summary disposition. Id. at 154. Conversely, the authors argued
that the fourth amendment reasonableness standard does allow for summary disposition of
section 1983 actions since "[a]n objective test allows a court to evaluate the factual statements
in the affidavits and make a determination of 'reasonableness.' . . . Judges ... can take even
conflicting affidavits, make inferences in the non-moving party's favor, and possibly render a
summary disposition of the case." (citation omitted). Id. Therefore, the authors concluded
that only the fourth amendment reasonableness standard can assist in freeing up the federal
court dockets. Id. at 154-55.
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than to prove that the officer applied the force maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.
16 8
B. Impact on Police Officers and Departments
As more plaintiffs prevail on section 1983 actions, there will be
several repercussions. First, police departments and cities faced with
increasing liability will be forced to put more emphasis on training
their officers in the proper use of force. 16 9 To be effective, the
increased training regimen will have to be coupled with well-defined
and well-disseminated police department policies on when and how
much force is permissible in various situations.1 70 The end result will
be positive. There will be a reduction in the number of excessive
force claims filed against the police, and a corresponding benefit to
society in the way of better trained, more informed police officers.
On the other hand, more plaintiff recoveries could have a negative
impact on police conduct. The increased threat of liability may mean
some police officers will be inclined to handle suspects with "kid
gloves," resulting in more police officers getting injured or killed
during encounters with suspects .171 Additionally, from a recovering
168. See Note, supra note 54, at 147 n.82 (concluding that the Seventh Circuit in Lester,
by remanding the case, indicated that it considered the substantive due process test to be a
higher standard for a plaintiff to meet than the reasonableness standard); supra notes 99-104
and accompanying text (discussing Lester).
169. Cf. Ronkowski, Uses and Misuses of Deadly Force, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 701 (1979).
Referring to liability for the unjustified use of deadly force, the author noted that under
Illinois law a plaintiff's lawyer has legal theories available on which to sue not only the police
officer, but also the officer's supervisors and the municipality for failure to provide sophisti-
cated firearms training. 1d. at 729. The author concluded that "the police officer will always
have the capability to be 'judge, jury, and executioner' .... Therefore, the answer to cries
of abuse lies in improved officer training." Id.
170. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) (reviewing various police
department policies which restrict the use of deadly force to certain situations). Cf. Comment,
Criminal Law: The Demise of the Fleeing Felon Rule, 25 WAsHnBUrN L.J. 164, 167 (1985)
(discussing various police department policies and state statutes which restrict a police officer's
use of deadly force to situations exposing the officer or the community to danger).
171. See Comment, supra note 170 at 172. Analyzing the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Tennessee v. Garner, the author wrote:
[A]Iready, individual officers are beginning to express the concern of the dissent [in
Garner] that they will be called upon to make split second constitutional decisions.
In an effort to comply with this new [fourth amendment reasonableness] standard,
they feel they might err on the side of caution to their own detriment.
Id. See also supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text (discussing Garner); Note, supra note
54, at 137-40. Surveying the pervasive crime and violence permeating American society, the
authors note that during the first six months of 1987, thirty-four law enforcement officers
were feloniously killed in the line of duty. Id. at 139. The authors argue that the proper test
of excessive force claims under section 1983 should afford police officers a "reasonable range
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plaintiff's perspective, a large judgment against an individual police
officer may provide little consolation, since unless the department or
municipality is also found liable, the judgment may go unsatisfied. 7 1
This in turn may reduce the deterrent effect that is a major purpose
behind section 1983. Despite these potential drawbacks, the Court's
decision in Graham should have a positive impact on the police. The
risk of injury to police officers, while real, can be reduced through
increased officer training. Finally, an alternate source of deterrence
of the use of unreasonable force lies in police department use of
force policies. An officer who violates one of these policies will be
subject to disciplinary action by the department, which could include
dismissal. 173 The risk of disciplinary action should make up for any
reduced deterrence resulting from unenforceable judgments against
police officers.
C. The Standard Applicable to Pre-Trial Detainees-an Open
Issue
The decision in Graham leaves unanswered the question of whether
the substantive due process test or the fourth amendment standard
is the proper standard for evaluating excessive force claims made by
pre-trial detainees. 174 There is disagreement among the courts of
appeal on this issue. In Wilkins v. May, 75 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that between arrest and conviction, the constitutional
test for analyzing excessive force claims is the substantive due process
test and not the fourth amendment standard. 76 However, the Ninth
of authority to engage in legitimate procedures on increasingly violent streets." Id. at 147.
Cf. Note, Criminal Law-The Right to Run: Deadly Force and the Fleeing Felon, 11 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 171, 183 (1986) (noting that a police officer, in trying to decide if deadly force is
justified, usually has only a split second to determine if the suspect poses a threat of harm to
the officer or others, and that the decision is often made under trying circumstances).
172. See Note, supra note 54, at 152-53: "Despite the allure of recovering compensatory
and punitive damages from the officer, the average patrol officer earns some $21,700 per year
and hardly provides a 'deep pocket' to satisfy a judgment. Realistically, victim recovery turns
on indemnity under [the municipality's] liability insurance". Id.
173. See, e.g., Chastain v. Civil Service Board, 327 So. 2d 230, 230-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (police officer who shot and wounded escaping prisoner without first exhausting
all other means of apprehension, in violation of department shooting policy, was dismissed
from the force).
174. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 n.10 (1989).
175. 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Wilkins v. McDaniel, 110 S. Ct.
733 (1990).
176. 872 F.2d at 193-95.
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Circuit, in Robins v. Harum,177 endorsed the continuing seizure idea-
that between the arrest and the charging of a suspect, the seizure
continues and police conduct is therefore subject to the fourth
amendment reasonableness standard.
1 7
While acknowledging that the issue was not before it, the Court
in Graham did give some indication of how it would decide the issue.
In a footnote, the Court specifically stated that it was leaving open
the question of whether the fourth amendment continues to provide
protection against the use of excessive force once pretrial detention
begins. 179 The Court then asserted that the due process clause clearly
protects pretrial detainees from the use of excessive force amounting
to punishment.180 However, this statement should not be seen as an
endorsement of the application of the substantive due process test to
pretrial detainee claims of excessive force. This is so because the
Graham Court was apparently referring to procedural due process
protection, not substantive due process protection, of pretrial detain-
ees. '8 Thus while procedural due process will protect detainees from
177. 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985).
178. Id. at 1009-10. See also Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 388 (4th Cir. 1987) (Phillips,
J., dissenting) ("'arrest,' if it be important to give it a duration, lasts as long as the arresting
officer retains custody of the person arrested, so that fourth amendment protections against
unreasonable uses of force clearly apply throughout that period"), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 2461
(1989). G
179. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 n.10 (1989).
180. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1969) (pretrial detainee challenging
the constitutionality of conditions of confinement and practices in federal short-term custodial
facility)). But see Freyermuth, supra note 79, at 701 n.54 (arguing that Wolfish was a class
action suit challenging various conditions of confinement, none of which involved the use of
serious physical force; that "[c]orrectly viewed, Wolfish stands for the proposition that the
constitutionality of official conduct is determined... by reference-to the primary constitutional
right implicated by that conduct" and concluding that Supreme Court precedent suggests that
use of force against a detainee "primarily implicates his fourth amendment interests in freedom
from bodily intrusions."). See also Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537-38. The Court in Wolfish
identified the factors to be applied to determine whether a governmental act is punitive in
nature:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in
differing directions.
Id. at 537 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (emphasis in
original).
181. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.10. The Court cites Wolfish for the proposition that
the due process clause "clear[ly] ... protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive
force that amounts to punishment." Id. In the portion of Wolfish cited in Graham, the Court
stated that under the due process clause, a detainee cannot be punished prior to an adjudication
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punishment, 8 2 their claims of excessive force not amounting to
punishment will apparently be analyzed by some other standard,
though not necessarily the substantive due process test of Johnson.'83
Additionally, the Court asserted that the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, and the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, are the
two principal sources of constitutional protection against physically
abusive government conduct.8 4 Of these two principal sources of
protection, only the fourth amendment is arguably applicable to
pretrial detainees' claims of excessive force, since the eighth amend-
ment's protections do not attach until after conviction.8 5
This "principal source" language in Graham, together with the
Court's application of the fourth amendment reasonableness standard
in Garner, lends support to the argument that the Court will even-
tually extend the protection of the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard to pretrial detainees. 86 While the Court in Graham asserted
of guilt. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535. In support of this statement, the Wolfish Court cited
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40, 674 (1977). This part of the Ingraham case
discusses the issues presented there exclusively in terms of "procedural due process" and
"procedural safeguards." Ingraham, 430 U.S. 671-82. Additionally, the Ingraham Court stated
that "at least where school authorities, . . . deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct
by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are implicated." Id. at 674 (emphasis in original). The reference
to "liberty interests" likewise supports the conclusion that the Ingraham Court was referring
to procedural due process. See also Comment, supra note 76, at 1392:
One may semantically transform the procedural notion that the state may not punish
in advance of trial into a claim of a substantive right to be free of summary
punishment no matter what process is offered. However, in either case it is the
procedure contemplated by the Constitution-the criminal trial-that has been flouted.
(emphasis added).
182. See supra note 180 (factors to consider in determining whether governmental act is
punishment).
183. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39. The Court in Wolfish concluded that in the absence
of an expressed intent to punish, if a particular condition of pretrial detention is "reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punish-
ment."' Id. at 538-39. However, if a condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal
but is arbitrary or purposeless, a court may permissibly conclude that the purpose of the
action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted on pretrial detainees. Id. at
539. Under this rationale, a claim by a plaintiff/detainee that a correctional officer used
excessive force on her while breaking up a fight between the plaintiff and another detainee
would not be deemed excessive force amounting to "punishment" because the officer's conduct
in breaking up the fight was "reasonably related to a legitimate government objective." Since
the claim would not be one of excessive force amounting to punishment, it seems that
procedural due process would not protect the detainee under the Graham Court's reasoning.
184. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1870.
185. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (eighth amendment analysis is
only appropriate after the state has complied with constitutional guarantees of a criminal
prosecution).
186. Compare Comment, supra note 76, at 1387-98 (arguing that when arrest is complete,
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that the procedural aspect of the due process clause protects detainees
from some instances of excessive force, substantive due process
protection would be redundant were the Court to hold that the fourth
amendment standard applies to pretrial detainee claims of excessive
force. This is because while the fourth amendment prohibits all
objectively unreasonable police force, the substantive due process test
only prohibits use of force that is "shocking to the conscience ' 18 7
or is applied "maliciously and sadistically" to cause harm.1 88 Clearly
then, police conduct which would be unconstitutional under the
substantive due process test would also be unconstitutional under the
fourth amendment reasonableness standard. 189 Thus, the Court should
establish once and for all that the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard is the exclusive test for evaluating pretrial detainees' exces-
sive force claims. If the Court does not extend the protection of the
fourth amendment standard to pretrial detainee claims of excessive
force, it will deny detainees the protection afforded persons at the
investigative stop and arrest stages.190 There is no justification for
affording a detainee less protection against excessive force than that
afforded an arrestee. Consider this example: Two suspects, A and
B, are arrested at the same time for the same offense. For any
physical encounter with the police during the respective arrests, the
fourth amendment reasonableness standard will be applied to evaluate
any alleged police brutality. Assume that A and B are booked and
while A posts bail and is released, B cannot afford to post bail and
is placed in pretrial confinement. In any physical encounter between
the due process clause should be invoked to protect the detainee; but also calling for a revision
of the applicable due process standard to one that eliminates the "severe injury" and "intent"
requirements of the Johnson test, and is "informed by" current notions of fourth amendment
"reasonableness") with Freyermuth, supra note 79, at 704-05 (advocating the evaluation of a
pretrial detainee's excessive force claim under the fourth amendment reasonableness standard).
187. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
188. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (1973), cert denied sub nom. Employee-Officer
John, #1765 Badge Number v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)
189. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1385 "If the fourth amendment prohibits the lesser
intrusion, it surely prohibits the greater; conduct that 'shocks the conscience' .. . surely cannot
be reasonable under the fourth amendment." Id.
190. See Freyermuth, supra note 79, at 705, where the author states:
Winston [v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)] made clear that a person outside of a cell
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bodily integrity that protects him
from ... [being compelled to undergo surgery to remove a bullet]. It is hard to
imagine why that expectation of privacy should become illegitimate simply because
the person is placed in a cell .... Instead, courts should analyze a detainee's
excessive force claim under the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard, allowing
due deference to state officials when exigencies of institutional security are present.
Id. See also supra note 104 (stating holding of Winston).
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A and the police while A is free on bail, the police may only use
force that is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. However,
a correctional officer, in an encounter with B, could use a greater
amount of force against B, so long as that force is not maliciously
and sadistically applied for the purpose of causing harm. There is
simply no justification for treating A and B differently simply because
A had the financial means to post bail while B did not. Thus, the
Court should extend the application of the fourth amendment rea-
sonableness standard to pretrial detainee claims of excessive force.
IV. CONCLUSION
Following the 1973 decision in Johnson v. Glick, the substantive
due process test as applied to excessive force claims brought against
government officials under section 1983 gained virtually unanimous
approval among the lower federal courts. With the Supreme Court's
1985 decision in Tennessee v. Garner however, the propriety of the
continued application of the substantive due process test to excessive
force claims arising out of arrest and stop situations was drawn into
question by courts and commentators. Indeed, some federal courts
expressly rejected the substantive due process test, choosing instead
to apply the fourth amendment reasonableness standard enunciated
in Garner, while others chose to apply both standards. Ir Graham
v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that all claims that police officers
used excessive force in making an arrest, an investigatory stop or
other seizure of the person, whether deadly force or not, should be
analyzed under the fourth amendment "objectively reasonable under
the circumstances" standard and not under the substantive due
process test.
The Graham decision should increase the likelihood that plaintiffs
seeking relief under section 1983 will prevail on their excessive force
claims. The "objectively reasonable under the circumstances" for-
mulation of the standard means that a jury no longer must find that
a police officer acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of
causing harm. Rather, any force found to be objectively unreasonable
under the circumstances will be unconstitutional. Additionally, the
Graham holding does away with the former requirement that a
plaintiff establish that he or she suffered severe injury in order to
recover. More plaintiff judgments should have a positive impact on
police officer training as well as police department use of force
policies and eventually lead to a reduction in the number of excessive
force claims filed.
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The Graham decision left open the question of whether the Su-
preme Court will extend the protection of the fourth amendment
reasonableness standard to claims of excessive force asserted by
pretrial detainees. Both Supreme Court precedent and language within
the Graham decision itself suggest that the Court may be inclined to
do just that. As there is no justification for affording a pretrial
detainee less protection than that afforded an arrestee, the Court
should make clear that the fourth amendment reasonableness stan-
dard is the exclusive test for analyzing excessive force claims brought
under section 1983 by pretrial detainees as well.
E. Bryan MacDonald

